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Between 1940 and 1945, Allied air forces dropped nearly 600,000 tons of bombs on France. The 
death toll, of perhaps 60,000 French civilians, is comparable to that of British victims of 
German bombing (51,500) plus V-weapon attacks (nearly 9,000).
1
 Yet the Allied bombing of 
France occupies a minor place in the literature. De Gaulle’s War Memoirs allow it the briefest of 
allusions.
2
 Histories of the Occupation concede it a few pages.
3
 Studies of bombing focus on 
Germany, briefly covering attacks on France in Spring 1944.
4
 Accounts of the Liberation focus 
on politics and on ground fighting, with bombing as a prelude and an accompaniment.
5
 The one 
full-length study of the subject, though comprehensive, is poorly sourced and sometimes 
unreliable.
6
 Not an untold story, the bombing of France is certainly an undertold one. 
This article aims to redress the balance partially, by analysing how the Allies chose to 
devote almost a quarter of their European bombing effort to France.
7
 First, it identifies the major 
stakeholders, and the fora and constraints within which they made policy. Second, it analyses 
the aims of bombing policy towards France. Finally, it examines how the British handled 
objections from Vichy and the Free French. 
Policy-making: actors and processes 
More than any other air force, the RAF had been developed from its foundation under Lord 
Trenchard as an independent service for bombing. Bombers dominated aircraft development 
programmes in the 1930s. Bomber Command’s Officer Commanding-in-Chief from February 
1942, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, saw the destruction of Germany’s industrial cities as 
the means to victory. Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff from 1940 to 1945, placed the 
strategic offensive against Germany at the heart of RAF strategy for most of the war. Attacking 
  
Germany, Bomber Command was executing a policy of which its leaders were forceful 
advocates.
8
 When the same aircraft attacked France, by contrast, Bomber Command was 
complying (sometimes unwillingly) with a strategy demanded and defined by others. 
The others were, firstly, the other services. The Admiralty wanted France attacked, as 
Germany’s forward base in the Battle of the Atlantic, from 1940. The Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), under Eisenhower, sought air support in North-West 
Europe as it prepared for the Overlord landings. The bombers also faced demands from political 
authorities. The Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) pressed for precision attacks on 
industrial targets in occupied territories as well as Germany. The Political Warfare Executive 
(PWE) used two bomber squadrons to drop agents and material into France, which also attracted 
45 per cent of its propaganda leaflets.
9
 In 1941–2, it also demanded raids against German-
related targets in France to demonstrate Britain’s will to continue fighting. The Foreign Office, 
meanwhile, shared PWE’s perspective to a degree, but also worried about alienating the Vichy 
government, the Free French, or the wider population.  
These diverse, often conflicting, demands converged upon the RAF’s political masters in 
the Air Ministry, and particularly on its Secretary of State from 1940 to 1945, Sir Archibald 
Sinclair. Lacking Cabinet rank, and serving under a Prime Minister who was also an activist 
Defence Minister, Sinclair acted as a policy broker not a policy initiator, balancing competing 
claims to limited resources and acting as the RAF’s spokesman to Parliament and public.10 
Sinclair also had to deal increasingly with the Americans, a consideration of direct relevance to 
France. All UK-based American raids until January 1943 targeted occupied territory; their 
volume grew, even after raids on Germany began, over the next two years.
11
 
Bombing policy was made under many constraints. The first was the availability of aircraft 
and bombs. Bomber Command dropped 13,000 tons of bombs on all targets in 1940, 32,000 in 
1941 and 45,500 (plus the US 8th Air Force’s 1,561) in 1942. These two air forces then dropped 
over 200,000 tons in 1943, and nearly 915,000 in 1944.
12
 Targeting priorities were still 
vigorously contested, but by 1944 there were many more bombs for everyone, as both French 
and Germans found.  
  
Political pressures complemented material constraints. Bombing policy was occasionally a 
domestic political issue, especially in the difficult year from late 1941 to late 1942.
13
 France, 
meanwhile, was officially neutral under Vichy, half-occupied by the Axis, recently an ally, and 
home to an internal and external Resistance movement with which Britain maintained relations, 
however stormy. Inevitably, operations here entailed difficult political choices.  
Vichy broke off diplomatic relations with Britain in July 1940 but unofficial contacts 
persisted through embassies at Madrid and Washington. The danger that France’s fleet and 
colonial possessions, especially in North-West Africa, would fall into German hands constantly 
preoccupied Churchill; fear of pushing Vichy into Germany’s arms restrained bombing policy.14 
So, for a time, did the United States. Like some 40 countries worldwide, Washington initially 
viewed Vichy as France’s legitimate government. Through its ambassador to Vichy, Admiral 
Leahy, the Roosevelt administration pursued positive engagement with Pétain’s régime even 
after America had entered the war; and Churchill had no wish to quarrel with Washington over 
France. Only Laval’s return to government in April 1942 prompted an American reappraisal and 
Leahy’s recall.15  
Indeed, the Vichy and American constraints largely disappeared in 1942. American aircraft 
bombed French targets from 17 August. The Torch landings of 8 November won North-West 
Africa for the Allies and precipitated the German occupation of the zone libre, the scuttling of 
the French fleet in Toulon, and the final diplomatic break between Vichy and Washington. 
These developments left Vichy with no further cards to play. Henceforth the British advocated 
restraint more than the Americans. 
This was chiefly out of concern at the reaction to bombing of the French generally, and of 
the Resistance and Free French in particular. A traumatised, homeless, and hostile French 
population might hinder the Allies’ re-entry to Europe; an unfriendly post-war French 
government would damage Britain’s position on the continent. Such concerns, argued forcefully 
by the Foreign Office, frequently clashed with military priorities over a four-year-long debate. 
The debate developed in many fora.
16 
 The War Cabinet, Britain’s supreme policy-making 
body, inevitably delegated much business to committees. The most important was the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee, which met nearly 2,400 times between 1940 and 1945.
17
 The Defence 
  
Committee, which included politicians as well as the service chiefs, met much less frequently. 
The Anti-U-Boat Committee played a crucial role, notably in relation to France’s ports, in the 
winter of 1942–3 before settling to more routine business as the North Atlantic crisis subsided.18 
At a lower level, the Bomb Target Committee met fortnightly.
19
 And within this framework, the 
Chief of Air Staff and the head of Bomber Command retained considerable operational freedom. 
America’s entry into the war complicated these processes. Major strategic priorities were 
now fixed at summits, paralleled by the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff. After 
December 1943, the formation of SHAEF triggered a reconfiguration of air command structures 
in anticipation of Overlord. British and American tactical air forces, under Air Marshal Sir 
Trafford Leigh-Mallory, were integrated into the SHAEF structure; strategic air forces, under 
Harris and his American counterpart, General Carl Spaatz, remained outside it but at the 
disposal, from 14 April 1944, of Eisenhower and his British deputy, Air Marshal Sir Arthur 
Tedder. From late May, a joint Bomber Operations Planning Staff managed operations over 
North-West Europe.
20
  
Policy emerged from these structures in the form of directives, approved (according to 
importance) by the Chiefs of Staff, the Defence Committee, or the War Cabinet, and outlining 
targets and priorities. In 1943, however, two wide-ranging directives – ‘Casablanca’ and 
‘Pointblank’ – were issued by the Combined Chiefs to the two strategic air forces after 
conferences in January and May. Another major directive, crucial to the bombing of France, was 
issued on 17 April 1944 directly by SHAEF. Concurrently, however, the Air Ministry or the Air 
Staff also issued more limited directives to Bomber Command.
21
 
Directives were not the totality of bombing policy. They were drawn up, in principle, within 
the framework of general rules on bombing policy issued in June 1940 and October 1942. Major 
directives were always compromises, allowing ‘unlimited scope for our differences of 
interpretation’.22 Operational conditions – the weather and the enemy – could prevent 
implementation; French targets were often detailed as to be attacked when bad weather 
prevented raids on Germany.
23
 Finally, raids on France, because of their political sensitivity, 
were often preceded by lengthy exchanges between Bomber Command, Portal, Sinclair, and 
  
even Churchill. The 1942 attack on the Schneider works at Le Creusot, for example, was 
suggested on 8 April, ordered in a directive dated 20 July, but only executed on 17 October.
24
 
Bombing policy towards France, therefore, was made by a broad range of participants, 
whose relative influence varied with the course of the war, and was subject, in principle, to 
tighter constraints than those applied to Germany.  
Bombing policy: general statements 
Unlike directives, the bombing policy statements of 31 May 1940 and 29 October 1942 defined 
rules of engagement rather than targets. That of 1940 was much the more restrictive. For all 
potential targets in enemy and enemy-occupied territory, it not only declared the ‘intentional 
bombardment of civil populations’ to be illegal, but also required that targets must be clearly 
identifiable, that care should be taken to avoid civilian casualties, and that Red Cross 
conventions be observed. A list of acceptable military targets followed, though the directive also 
specified as legitimate ‘other objectives, the destruction of which is an immediate military 
necessity’.25  
The Armistice of June 1940 raised the question of applying these rules to France, and 
arguments within the Air Ministry that summer reflected Britain’s ambiguous attitude to Vichy. 
26
 Sinclair’s initial memorandum on France, as accepted by the War Cabinet, was more 
restrictive than the statement of 31 May: the list of legitimate targets was shorter and the zone 
libre off limits. Though accepting that military objectives in unoccupied France ‘should be 
destroyed’, the Cabinet refused British bombardment as a means to do so, optimistically 
preferring the idea of Gaullist sabotage.
27
  
The second general statement, dated 29 October 1942, formalised what had become a 
radical difference in policy towards enemy and enemy-occupied territories. In relation to 
Germany, the directives of 9 July 1941 and 14 February 1942 identified destroying civilian 
morale as an essential goal:
28
 the statement of 29 October 1942 argued that the enemy’s resort to 
‘unrestricted air warfare’ justified the area bombing of Germany, Italy, and Japan. For occupied 
territory, on the other hand, the 29 October statement reproduced much of the June/July 1940 
policy. It reinforced provisions against civilian casualties, stating that ‘if any doubt exists as to 
  
the possibility of accurate bombing and if a large error would involve the risk of serious damage 
to a populated area, no attack is to be made’. Yet daytime raids on French railway locomotives 
and nocturnal attacks on all French trains were authorised: only Germans and 
‘collaborationists’, it was assumed, could travel by night.29 The statement still applied only to 
Occupied France. In 1941, General Hastings Ismay, Military Secretary to the War Cabinet, had 
countered Portal’s proposal to attack the zone libre by stating that unoccupied France was ‘in 
certain senses a neutral country’.30 A year later, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden’s 
recommendation of no change until Pétain was ‘behaving much worse than he is at present’ was 
still the consensus.
31
 However, the Germans’ move into the southern zone on 11 November led, 
within weeks, to raids here too. And as we shall see, operational requirements could override the 
general policy statements. 
The Evolution of Policy, 1940–45 
Thirty-two major directives issued between 4 July 1940 and 14 September 1944 – the 
approximate period of the Occupation – are reprinted in the Official History. Of these, 21 
concern France directly. Their main objectives can be considered under nine headings (Table 
1).
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Preventing a German invasion of the UK was a primary objective of bombing policy from 
June 1940, and a secondary one into 1941. Main targets were German shipping and barges in 
ports from Calais to Le Havre, and Luftwaffe airfields in France. The Channel ports were 
heavily attacked on 7 September 1940, when invasion was considered imminent.
33
 Coastal 
barges were easy targets and these raids succeeded. But Bomber Command could still muster 
only limited forces: some attacks on airfields were undertaken by single unescorted 
Blenheims.
34
 The French General Staff’s post-war survey indicated 292 French dead in Allied 
raids in 1940.
35
 
Offering operational experience to new aircrews was an explicit aim of the directive of 30 
October 1940.
36
 Trenchard referred to the Channel Ports as ‘a bombing range’, offering ‘good 
practice for our pilots before they bombed Germany’.37 ‘Freshman’ crews were used against 
Dutch, Belgian, and French Channel ports in 1942; Harris sent training units to non-German 
  
targets in 1943.
38
 The US 8th Air Force – all freshmen at the start – chose France, a relatively 
undefended target, for 52 per cent of its first year’s sorties.39 
Drawing Luftwaffe fighters from other fronts was a primary bombing aim in the Directive 
of 5 May 1942. These ‘circus’ operations, typically involving between 20 and 40 (usually 
medium) bombers with fighter escort, had been run over northern France since January 1941. 
Portal presented them as one of the Allies’ rare means to ‘help the Russians’. Halted in Winter 
1941–2, scaled back after heavy RAF losses from June 1942, these operations still exposed 
targets from Rotterdam to Caen to repeated low-intensity bombardment.
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German warships in French ports appeared in directives at the beginning and end of 1941. 
Between December 1940 and June 1941, two heavy cruisers (Hipper and Prinz Eugen) and the 
battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, docked at Brest; and between January 1941 and 
February 1942 Brest received 25 major raids (of over 50 bombers) and numerous smaller ones.
41
 
In Winter 1941–2, indeed, an unwilling Bomber Command devoted a third of its sorties to 
Brest.
42
 In one sense the raids worked: none of the vessels emerged to attack an Atlantic convoy, 
and their escape up the Channel, on 12 February 1942, removed them as a threat. But all damage 
to them was done, unknown to the British, before August 1941; subsequent raids merely 
destroyed lives and property in Brest. No big German surface warships ever returned to France. 
But the presence of smaller vessels, Axis merchant shipping, and submarines, attracted 
continued raids on French ports. 
The destruction of French factories working for Germany was a major aim in three 
directives of 1942, and a lesser priority (at least relatively) thereafter. In part, such attacks aimed 
simply to disrupt German war production in France. But they were also seen as benefiting the 
Allies’ political standing in Europe. When Eden wrote to Sinclair, in April 1942, of the ‘bracing 
effect on French morale’ of raids on factories in France, adding that ‘our allies in every occupied 
territory are crying out for similar raids’, he reflected a consensus among Britain’s military and 
political leaders.
43
 Later that year, Sinclair viewed the Gien tank park as a second-rate target 
because it was preferable, for psychological reasons, ‘to attack objectives near large towns’.44 
The directive of 25 May 1942 specifically sought to ‘give substance to the policy of the Political 
Warfare Executive which aims at discouraging the nationals of enemy occupied countries from 
  
working in German-controlled factories’.45 Discouragement was also aimed at factory owners or 
managers working or considering working with the Germans: some, indeed, were persuaded by 
the Resistance to help sabotage their own plants to avoid raids.
46
 Air raids as propaganda largely 
disappeared from the agenda after 1942, however. Torch, El Alamein, and Stalingrad offered 
clearer proof of Allied credibility; and bombing could readily have a negative as well as a 
positive propaganda value. 
The political risks were readily understood. These were not self-evidently military targets 
and some civilian casualties were inevitable. Attacks were planned with corresponding 
circumspection. When Sinclair sought approval for the night bombing of four key factories in 
November 1941, the War Cabinet deferred the decision for a month.
47
 It did so again in 
December, citing ‘the recent PETAIN-GOERING conversations’ as a reason: ‘if fuller 
collaboration is in fact hanging in the balance these attacks might weigh it against us.’48 
Approval was given after Christmas, when the Pétain-Goering talks had proved inconclusive.
49
 
Then American efforts to limit Axis use of Vichy’s colonial territories stalled bombing plans 
again. In the Foreign Office, Cavendish-Bentinck minuted the potential dangers to relations with 
the State Department. Raids should neither push France further towards Germany nor provoke a 
quarrel with Britain’s new and powerful ally.50 
Ideal industrial targets were big, visible and clearly linked to Germany. They included 
Renault’s Boulogne-Billancourt plant, Matford-Ford at Poissy, the Gnôme-Rhône aero-engine 
works at Gennevilliers, and the Villacoublay aircraft works.
51
 Other targets, such as Citröen’s 
Quai de Javel plant in Paris, the Schneider works at Le Creusot and Gnôme-Rhône at Le Mans, 
followed. Operational instructions also aimed to minimise civilian casualties: the directive of 25 
May 1942 stressed good weather, clear visibility, and experienced crews. Night operations were 
normally restricted to military targets distant from civilian dwellings.
52
 Moreover, individual 
raids were discussed, sometimes at length, by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Defence 
Committee, and the War Cabinet, and could still be put off for political reasons.
53
 Finally, 
attacks were preceded, in principle, by warnings, and followed by propaganda leaflets, stressing 
that the factories concerned had worked for Germany.
54
 
  
In these respects, the first big raid, against Renault on 3/4 March 1942, appeared perfect. 
Harris calls it ‘the first attack in which the principle of concentration in time and space was 
effectively employed’; the brand-new Gee navigational aid, plus clear moonlight, enabled 235 
aircraft to bomb accurately at low level. He added that daylight attacks in France were also 
possible against the weak German defences, though ‘we were often able to attack by night with 
equal precision’.55 But the Renault raid still killed over 370 civilians – more than in any raid 
hitherto on Germany. The French service of the BBC deplored the lack of adequate warning.
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The raid did less damage than initially thought; Renault was revisited by the US 8th Air Force 
three times in 1943.
57
 Attacks on Gennevilliers, Poissy, and Le Creusot later in 1942 established 
that Bomber Command’s inaccuracy could leave industrial targets barely damaged while 
demolishing nearby workers’ housing.58 Periodic raids on French industry nevertheless 
continued, and were reinforced under the Pointblank directive of June 1943. Accuracy improved 
in 1944, and that was marked by a number of daring precision raids on French industrial 
targets.
59
  
U-boat bases in France were a regular target from 1941 to 1943. They appear in nine 
directives, in four as a major objective. The attacks of early 1943, moreover, provide a striking 
contrast with the previous year’s political caution towards industrial targets. U-boats, after all, 
had the potential to defeat Britain. By the end of 1940, they occupied bases at Brest, Lorient, La 
Pallice (near La Rochelle), Bordeaux and St-Nazaire.
60
 The Admiralty requested heavy raids on 
these bases in October 1941. Bomber Command, however, absorbed with surface warships in 
Brest, missed the opportunity to bomb the concrete U-boat pens then under construction, The 
pens proved indestructible by existing bombs after their completion in Spring 1942.
61
  
Nevertheless, the Biscay bases returned to the agenda late that year, when the U-boats 
appeared to be winning at a time when America’s entry into the war was multiplying both 
transatlantic traffic and American concerns at shipping losses.
62
 Losses of British, Allied and 
neutral merchant shipping, roughly stable at 3.9 million tons in 1940 and 4.2 million in 1941, 
nearly doubled to 7.7 million tons in 1942.
63
 The new anti-U-boat Committee met for the first 
time to address the threat on 13 November; it discussed the Biscay ports four times before the 
year’s end.  
  
These meetings, and the War Cabinet decision that followed them in January, marked an 
extraordinary departure from the policy statement of 29 October 1942. Churchill blocked raids 
on the ports on 13 November on political grounds, but cautiously authorised moonlight raids on 
the ports after the 18 November meeting. ‘Need for accuracy’, said Bomber Command’s orders 
the next day, ‘is stressed not only to ensure effective attack but also because of desirability on 
political grounds to avoid undue civilian casualties’. But on 9 December, the Committee 
considered area bombing raids against the ports. Eden’s reaction was hostile: although ‘the 
French react well to precision bombing of military objectives’, he argued, ‘any apparently 
unnecessary slaughter of French civilians would almost certainly have a bad effect among the 
Fighting French and in North Africa, apart from the harm it would do us with public opinion in 
France both during and after the war’. Sinclair and the Air Staff, sceptical about the 
effectiveness of the enterprise, backed Eden, and the Committee’s meeting of 23 December was 
deadlocked. But when the First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound, put his proposal to the War 
Cabinet with Churchill’s authorisation on 11 January 1943, his assessment of the U-boat threat, 
and his proposed remedy – American ‘precision’ bombing by day and British area bombing by 
night – he convinced even Eden. General warnings to civilians to leave coastal areas were 
agreed, but anything more specific was refused for the aircrews’ safety.  
Instructions for area bombing of the Biscay ports, with a pause to assess results after 
Lorient, were issued to Bomber Command on 14 January; an Air Ministry telegram of the same 
day specified that ‘the CinC is at liberty to choose any aiming point even if the resultant 
bombing causes complete devastation of the inhabited areas of the town’.64 This was the only 
explicit instruction of the war to undertake area bombing against France. The general policy 
statement of 29 October 1942, then, was discarded when Britain faced an immediate danger 
which it was believed unrestricted bombing could overcome. The removal, with the Torch 
landings, of diplomatic constraints linked to Vichy may also explain the willingness to embrace 
area bombing. Between them, Bomber Command and the US 8th Air Force dropped 9,133 tons 
of bombs on the Biscay ports from January to May 1943.
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 One Bomber Command attack on 
Lorient delivered over 1,000 tons on a single target for the first time in any one raid of the war.
66
  
  
Subsequent reconnaissance over Lorient showed a wrecked town and intact submarine pens. 
By 10 March, Pound’s best claim for the bombing was that it had prevented three U-boat 
cruises; over 240 U-boats were operational at the time. Invited by Churchill to comment on the 
Biscay offensive, Harris wrote that the Admiralty’s requirements would absorb Bomber 
Command’s entire efforts for at least two months and entail the complete destruction of 
Bordeaux and La Rochelle; moreover, ‘The futility of the policy suggested is demonstrated by 
the fact that Lorient, on which 4,000 tons of bombs have been dropped, still heads the list of 
precision targets for day bombing’. These views, expounded to the Committee on 31 March, led 
to the discontinuation of major raids on Biscay ports, but did not prevent the US 8th Air Force 
from flying over 900 sorties against the Biscay ports in the next six months.
67
 The last attacks 
on the Biscay bases, in August 1944, penetrated some shelters with the new 12,000lb ‘Tallboy’ 
bombs. By that time, the Battle of the Atlantic had been largely won, not by bombing submarine 
bases, but by coastal mining and airborne attacks on U-boats at sea, the fruit of improved 
technology and a modest diversion of aircraft from Bomber to Coastal Command.
68
  
German V-weapons based in France also threatened Britain directly, though less severely 
than U-boats. V-1 sites, codenamed ‘Crossbow’, appeared in three directives in 1944, twice as a 
major objective, and attracted heavy attacks on northern France from December 1943 until its 
liberation late in August 1944. With sites located in the countryside, the risk of civilian 
casualties and consequent political fallout raised few concerns.
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 But Crossbow sites were small, 
quickly installed, widely dispersed, and easily simulated as dummies. In the cloudy summer of 
1944, they taxed even the skills of 617 squadron.
70
 Less virtuoso formations typically churned 
up fields and orchards around the sites, damaging access to the targets. V-weapon sites, chiefly 
in France, took 117,256 tons of bombs from 5 December 1943 to 3 September 1944, roughly 
one fifth of the total Allied tonnage dropped on French targets; for Tedder, the policy amounted 
to using a ‘sledgehammer for a tintack’. But attacks, in particular, on the larger supply sites 
significantly curbed the V-1 offensive on Britain.
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The rail system of northern France was the central objective of Allied bombing in the 
spring of 1944, appearing in a British directive of 4 March and, above all, in the SHAEF 
directive of 17 April. Opposed by an unholy alliance between airmen wanting to continue 
  
bombing Germany and politicians worried about civilian casualties, it generated fierce debate, 
both in the Defence Committee on 5, 13, 19, and 26 April, and 3 May, and at War Cabinet 
meetings, on 3 and 27 April and 2 May.
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 The outcome was not only the bombing of French 
towns on an unprecedented scale but also the transfer of bombing policy from the political 
authorities to SHAEF. 
Rail targets had been attacked since early in the war, with 419 raids in the four months to 31 
January 1943; the question of legitimate targets had been warmly debated.
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 The policy of 1944, 
however, was altogether more systematic. It aimed to wreck rail centres – above all repair 
facilities – ensuring that tactical raids could then durably disrupt enemy communications and 
stall German reinforcements in the crucial days after the Normandy landings. The Overlord 
command team that assembled in London in December 1943 – Eisenhower as Commander-in-
Chief, Tedder as his deputy, and Solly Zuckerman as scientific adviser – chose for France the 
strategy they had pursued together, with some success, in the Mediterranean
74
; by late January 
1944 Zuckerman had prepared proposals involving some 79 ‘nodal points’ on French and 
Belgian railways.  
There followed two successive policy debates, the first wholly military, the second largely 
political. In the military debate Tedder, the leading advocate of what became the ‘Transportation 
Plan’, faced objections from both bomber chiefs. Harris claimed that Bomber Command would 
not achieve sufficient accuracy, and that the plan was a pointless diversion from the strategic 
offensive against Germany; Spaatz sought a concentration on German oil targets. Harris’s 
predictions about accuracy were confounded by experimental raids, authorised by Portal, on 
marshalling yards at Trappes and Le Mans early in March.
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 Both Portal and Leigh-Mallory now 
backed Tedder. At the crucial military meeting of 25 March, Spaatz conceded that oil raids 
would have little immediate effect, while advocates of smaller, later, tactical raids on French 
targets were reassured that the Transportation Plan included their priorities. Two days later, the 
Combined Chiefs agreed to place tactical and strategic air forces under Eisenhower’s overall 
control; and Tedder was briefed to write the SHAEF directive of 17 April.
76
  
The political debate opened with memos to Churchill, from Portal and Ismay, warning of 
‘between 80,000 and 160,000 [civilian] casualties … of which a quarter would be killed’.77 At 
  
the Defence Committee and War Cabinet discussions, the plan’s supporters (Tedder, Portal, and 
on one occasion Zuckerman) faced opposition from an aggressively sceptical Churchill, who 
doubted the military benefits of ‘slaughtering’ French civilians and feared a consequent 
‘unhealable breach’ between France and its Atlantic allies; from all the politicians on the 
Defence Committee bar Sinclair; and from military members including the Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff, Sir Alan Brooke, and Sidney Bufton, Director of Bombing Operations. Eden, in 
particular, cited the RAF’s reputation on the continent, the need to retain the co-operation of rail 
workers in sabotage operations, and above all the potential damage of difficult post-war Anglo-
French relations ‘in a Europe that was already looking more to Russia than we would wish’. He 
also argued that the French might accept civilian casualties ‘in the heat of battle’, but not as part 
of a calculated plan, inviting ‘propaganda which suggested that while Russian armies defeated 
the enemy armies in the east, the British and Americans confined their efforts to killing French 
women and children’.78 
Six factors overcame the objections. The first was inertia. The raids started anyway in 
March, and by the Defence Committee meeting of 26 April, the plan was two-fifths complete, 
with 32 out of the 79 targets hit and 26,000 tons of bombs dropped. A week earlier, Brooke had 
switched to supporting it rather than change plan barely six weeks before D-Day. Secondly, the 
casualty estimates were lowered, chiefly on the basis that the bomb weight needed for the 
programme had been exaggerated. These lower estimates were then, broadly, confirmed on the 
ground. At the Defence Committee of 3 May Tedder claimed, with 3,000–4,000 deaths so far, 
that the total could come within the ceiling of 10,000 proposed by Churchill. Third, intelligence 
summaries did not suggest that the French were turning decisively against their future liberators. 
Fourth, Tedder agreed to limit the programme to localities where 100 deaths or fewer could be 
expected. Fifth, an appeal from the War Cabinet to Eisenhower produced a letter on 2 May, 
drafted by Tedder, stating unambiguously that the success of D-Day depended on the Plan. 
Finally, when Churchill turned to Roosevelt as final arbiter, the President gave Eisenhower his 
full backing.
79
  
Between 3 March and 5 June 1944, the Allied air forces dropped 63,635 tons of bombs on 
Transportation targets. Bomber Command’s 40,930 tons represented 40 per cent of its effort 
  
over the period.
80
 The demands both of deception over the invasion area and of ‘interdiction in 
depth’ meant that targets extended beyond Normandy to the Loire, the Paris region, and 
northwards into Belgium.
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 By late May, with rail capacity virtually halved, almost nothing but 
German military supplies moved by train across northern France. Troops had to detrain in the 
Paris region, or even at Metz; Allied air superiority in Normandy then prevented any daytime 
troop movements by road.
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 The post-D-day follow-up to the Transportation Plan by medium 
bombers and fighter-bombers, though hampered by bad weather, was often more economical 
than the heavy attacks, and helped ensure a steady deterioration in the Germans’ supply position 
through July and August.
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Despite the successes achieved in the experimental raids of March,
84
 inaccurate bombing 
persisted, and casualties certainly exceeded the 100 on any single target hoped for by the War 
Cabinet. On 18 April, according to Florentin, Bomber Command killed 1,500 civilians in three 
raids, on Juvisy, Noisy-le-Sec, and Rouen.
85
 But Churchill’s figure of 10,000 was probably not 
exceeded by much: Florentin’s accounts of separate raids, including Lyon and St-Étienne but 
excluding targets further south, come to just below 11,000.
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 Churchill followed developments 
closely, sending Tedder one-line memoranda with questions such as ‘How does your score stand 
now?’ On 23 May, Tedder declared 6,062 deaths on Axis estimates (which he presumed were 
high, for propaganda reasons), adding that his ‘credit balance’ now stood at 3,938. A week later, 
after an intense Whitsun weekend of bombing, the Axis figures stood at 10,776. Churchill’s last 
memorandum of the kind, asking ‘How many Frenchmen did you kill?’ is dated 10 July, by 
which time Tedder’s estimate had fallen below 10,000.87 
The Transportation Plan discussions were the climax of the debate over bombing policy 
towards France because they concentrated concerns raised earlier but less systematically: the 
difficulty of accurate bombing, the respective merits of bombing German and other targets, and 
the humanitarian and political objections to killing French civilians. After May 1944, the debate 
was closed, and control over bombing policy passed to SHAEF. The Defence Committee, scene 
of the fiercest arguments, met just twice more during the European war, on 20 July 1944 and 26 
January 1945. But both the V-weapon threat and the need to support ground operations ensured 
that raids on France were far from over. 
  
Support for ground forces, prepared by the Transportation Plan, took many forms: attacks 
on airfields, ammunition or fuel dumps, coastal batteries, radar stations, or transport targets, but 
also direct attacks on enemy positions in Normandy and, in August, in southern France.
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Indeed, Allied bombing on French territory peaked in the three months after D-Day.
89
 Conscious 
of the risks, Eisenhower signed a formal instruction to the bomber chiefs on 2 June stressing the 
need to minimise civilian casualties.
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Three types of attack deserve particular attention. First, villages and small towns situated at 
cross-roads, so-called ‘choke points’, were bombed just before and after D-Day. Opposed by 
Tedder, but demanded by the army commanders and agreed by Leigh-Mallory, these raids did 
little to slow German reinforcements.
91
 They also wrecked towns such as Lisieux, Vire, or 
Évrecy, with high civilian casualties.
92
 Secondly, six major Allied ground attacks in Normandy 
used heavy bomber support. At Saint-Lô, bombing materially assisted the American break-out, 
though at the price of some casualties among US soldiers.
93
 By contrast, the bombing of Caen 
and its suburbs in operations Charnwood and Goodwood, on 7–9 and 18–21 July, killed some 
2,000 of Caen’s residents and actually hindered the British advance by destroying and cratering 
large urban areas.
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 Thirdly, heavy bombers attacked German ‘fortresses’ (Festungen) 
established in ports, to prevent long sieges and delays to the Allied advance. Their effectiveness 
in this role was mostly limited.
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 Bomber Command’s September raids on Le Havre, for 
example, wrecked most of the city centre, killed over 1,500 civilians, but made little impact – 
less than the concurrent artillery bombardment – on German ground defences or coastal 
batteries.
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The battle for France also saw sustained and effective ground support by the tactical air 
forces. The three types of attack above are highlighted, however, partly because they illustrate 
how bombing policy had escaped political control by June 1944. Between commanders, it 
remained controversial: Leigh-Mallory favoured unrestricted use of heavy bombers in ground 
support, Tedder was sceptical, and the bomber chiefs wanted to return to Germany.
97
 Political 
intervention however, had vanished from the debate. Raids of the scope of those on Caen or Le 
Havre, which would formerly have required Cabinet approval, were now decided within 
SHAEF. Tedder’s reply to Churchill’s note of 10 July expressed the fear that casualties in Caen 
  
and elsewhere would ‘dwarf’ the death toll of 10,000 from the Transportation Plan.98 But 
Churchill did not follow it up. The destruction of Le Havre was reported, to SHAEF and to 
Cabinet, as a routine operation alongside attacks on German targets.
99
 Only the most obvious 
mistakes, such as raids undertaken in error on Royan and Calais in 1945, prompted open 
expressions of concern.
100
  
This withdrawal of political control can be explained in two ways. First, civilian casualties 
were viewed as more acceptable in the ‘heat of battle’: as Churchill observed to Roosevelt, after 
D-Day, ‘when British and United States troops will probably be losing at a much higher rate, a 
new proportion establishes itself in men’s minds’.101 Secondly, Allied political agents in France 
discerned sullenness among civilians but little of the ‘hatred’ for the Western Allies, or of a 
surge in support for Russia at the West’s expense, feared by Churchill and Eden.102 The strictly 
political objections to unrestricted bombing had disappeared. Nor were the concerns of the Free 
French expressed forcefully enough to have any significant effect on the policy. 
Dealing with the French 
The only available French responses to their ordeal were verbal. Complaints reached London 
from both Vichy and the Free French. This section compares the treatment of complaints from 
the two sources. 
Vichy responded to air raids both via anti-Allied propaganda and through protests, 
addressed through a variety of channels. Equally, British reactions to Vichy included positive 
welcome, concern, indifference, irritation, riposte, and (very occasionally) concessions.  
The British welcomed Vichy propaganda that linked Allied raids with the Resistance. In 
June 1942, for example, Paul Marion, Vichy’s Secretary of State for Information, compared the 
‘cowardly blows’ of recent raids on the Paris suburbs to attacks on German soldiers and 
collaborators by Communist résistants or ‘professional terrorists’.103 Marion echoed Pétain, and 
the Vichy press, in condemning the ‘criminal aggression of a former ally’. But Harold Balfour, 
Sinclair’s Under-Secretary, argued that his speech ‘plays into our hands’ by emphasising a 
community of aim between British raids and French résistants, whether Communist or not.
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The British were more worried by German propaganda in France. One film, distributed 
widely after the Renault raid, showed ‘death and destruction; nauseating to a degree’, provoked 
‘anti British cries’ from audiences, and according to Alvary Gascoigne, the British Consul in 
Tangier, did ‘more harm to Anglo-French relations than any other propaganda as yet conceived 
by the Germans’.105 German propaganda, however, would stop neither bombing nor civilian 
deaths: Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, stated that 
the ‘environs of Paris are no more sacrosanct than Brest, Boulogne and other places’.106 But 
counter-propaganda was needed, and supplied, to show damage to plant instead of people.
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Vichy’s complaints, as opposed to propaganda, could lead to genuine uncertainty in the 
British camp. In Spring 1941 Fernand de Brinon, Vichy’s representative in Paris, protested 
against the bombing of Lorient and of Brest, where a hospital was hit. William Mack, of the 
French desk at the Foreign Office, instructed the Ministry of Information to blame the Germans 
for using the Brest hospital as a human shield for a military objective. The MOI demurred, 
arguing that any answer involves some admission of error or guilt. The French desk insisted, 
nevertheless, on deflecting blame onto the Germans to ‘score a propaganda point’; and a 
statement was issued over the MOI’s objections.108 
Complaints believed to originate with Germany were dismissed by the Foreign Office. Both 
the mayor of Dieppe and the municipal council of Le Havre protested (the former via Madrid 
diplomatic channels) in 1941 at bombs falling on residential areas. Mack thought it ‘preferable 
to ignore this protest’ in both cases. The Vichy government’s backing for the complaints was 
uncertain, and the Foreign Office suspected ‘a German or German-inspired plan to get the local 
authorities in occupied France’ to protest.109 
By contrast, top-level complaints from Vichy were taken more seriously. Thus a formal 
Vichy government protest (via Madrid) at damage to life and property through high-altitude 
attacks on Lille and Brest was discussed at the War Cabinet on 25 August. Churchill remarked 
that Vichy had made no complaint of principle against the RAF bombing objectives in occupied 
France, only against inaccurate bombing that hit civilians; other ministers observed that Vichy 
seemed not to object to attacks on the German war machine. The Cabinet decided that pilots 
attacking occupied territory should be instructed not to bomb if accuracy was in doubt; these 
  
instructions would reappear in the bombing policy statement of October 1942.
110
 Piétri, Vichy’s 
ambassador in Madrid, received a telegram expressing regret for the loss of life, and 
emphasising the care which pilots took.
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 This complaint, therefore, reached Cabinet, elicited a 
sympathetic response and even prompted an adjustment – on paper at least – in policy. 
Vichy complaints channelled through Washington, on the other hand, could irritate the 
British, especially in the eleven months between Pearl Harbor and Torch. Vichy’s Ambassador 
in Washington, Gaston Henry-Haye, complemented his complaints to US Under-Secretary of 
State Sumner Welles about the Renault bombing with a press conference. This combination 
worried Eden, who feared that neutral opinion would believe that ‘[Henry-Haye’s] statements 
find a certain sympathy in United States official circles’. He therefore instructed Britain’s 
ambassador to Washington, Lord Halifax, to inform Welles of his view that Henry-Haye’s 
‘statements to the Press are harmful and only to the benefit of the Axis’.112 Welles listened: 
when Henry-Haye protested at Allied overflights of unoccupied French airspace in October 
1942, he remarked that it was ‘utterly preposterous for France to hide behind the terms of the 
Armistice and at the same time claim the privileges of a neutral’. The British nevertheless 
investigated even this complaint, concerned about violations of Vichy neutrality, though they 
found no evidence of RAF involvement.
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Given its poor relations with Vichy, it was unremarkable that the British government should 
brush most of its complaints aside. Yet such consideration as was given suggests that Vichy 
maintained some bargaining power before November 1942. Torch changed that. By the spring 
of 1944, leaked Vichy prefects’ reports claiming that bombing was alienating French opinion 
from the Allies were discounted as biased by the British.
114
 
How did the British government treat representations on bombing policy from forces 
opposed to Vichy? To one type of message they proved highly receptive. In July 1941 the 
British legation in Berne forwarded a memorandum from ‘a friend in the French Embassy’ 
claiming that British bombing of industry would deter French business from collaborating with 
Germany. Citing this among other messages, Sinclair argued to the War Cabinet in November 
that ‘Frenchmen have repeatedly asked us to bomb French factories working for Germany’.115 
  
More frequently, however, the internal Resistance and the Free French complained, less about 
the principle than about the inaccuracy of bombing. 
On 16 April 1943, for example, René Massigli, foreign affairs spokesman for the Comité 
Français de Libération Nationale, protested to Eden about US high-altitude raids on France, 
expressing fear of growing anti-American feeling. He suggested limiting these attacks to 
unpopulated areas, and ‘teaching our American friends some British methods’.116 Eden brought 
the issue to Cabinet on 19 April and, when informed that the USAAF would henceforth attack 
only submarine bases, pressed Sinclair for still tighter constraints on US operations.
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 However, 
before Massigli was informed of the decision, policy had again changed. To restrict USAAF 
activities even this far would mean abandoning a campaign against railways in France. 
Accordingly, a list of French targets would be compiled for War Cabinet approval and – a minor 
concession – the USAAF would ‘attempt to reduce the danger to the population through suitable 
choice of target’.118 
This policy was itself overtaken by the ‘Pointblank’ directive of May 1943, apparently 
without Eden’s full realisation. He complained twice to Sinclair, on 30 September and 7 
October 1943, about casualties during recent US raids on Paris, which he believed breached 
agreed restrictions on USAAF operations and could provoke Vichy or German propaganda to 
rouse ‘mass indignation against the Americans and ourselves or against the Americans in 
contrast to ourselves’. Making Massigli’s complaint effectively his own, he demanded an impact 
assessment of US 8th Air Force attacks and ‘high level representations to Washington’.119 
Sinclair, however, reminded him that agreed Pointblank targets, overriding earlier restrictions, 
included Luftwaffe and aircraft industry centres in occupied territories.
120
 Meanwhile, Sinclair’s 
secretary, the young Reginald Maudling, produced a detailed, upbeat, survey of recent American 
raids on occupied territories in order to ‘repel any further attacks’.121 Eden backed down; his 
support for a restrictive policy, inspired by Massigli, came second to military necessity defined 
by the Combined Chiefs. 
A letter that October to Eisenhower from General Giraud, still officially the military head of 
the CFLN, had no more practical effect than Massigli. Giraud wrote that the French people 
applauded Allied destruction of industrial plants on French soil, and praised the air crews’ 
  
bravery, but warned that ‘on French territory some [raids] cost more than the results they yield 
are worth’, in terms of damage to lives and property.122 Suggesting a response from the Air 
Ministry, William Mackenzie argued that Giraud had ‘approached a very difficult problem in a 
helpful and realistic spirit, and that he is entitled to a fairly full reply’.123 Mackenzie’s draft in 
this vein, respectful of Giraud’s military expertise, was not sent. Instead, the Chiefs of Staff 
composed a ‘soothing reply’ in late November expressing regret and acknowledging ‘the 
fortitude of the French nation’, but no more.124 No practical measures ensued. 
Free French protests reached a climax as the Allies debated the Transportation Plan. Three 
separate Free French documents reached London from Algiers in April/May 1944: a 
memorandum from Massigli handed to Alfred Duff Cooper (British representative with the 
CFLN in Algiers) on 5 April; a brochure on Allied bombing and its effects on French morale, 
dated 25 April; and a detailed survey of the same issue dated 17 May.
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 Their messages were 
consistent with one another and (broadly) with the Foreign Office view: the French supported 
precision attacks on legitimate targets but deplored apparently indiscriminate high-altitude 
bombing; the association of the latter with the USAAF damaged the Americans’ standing with 
the French; the use of delayed-action bombs was universally condemned; Vichy propaganda was 
being handed golden opportunities; and sabotage could produce better results with fewer 
casualties. Massigli also requested Free French involvement in the choice of targets, prompting 
a favourable response from the Foreign Office, which pointed out the ‘advantage to us if the 
French Committee could be induced to share the responsibility’ for target selection.126 
Although French civilian casualties were central to political debates on the Transportation 
Plan these French interventions had little, if any, effect on policy. Four reasons can be 
suggested. The first was timing: the two long analyses of bombing and public opinion (though 
not Massigli’s earlier memorandum) reached London after the essential issues had been decided. 
Secondly, the CFLN’s military representatives in London appeared not to share the Algiers 
perspective. General Koenig, the CFLN’s representative to SHAEF since March, told 
Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff Walter Bedell Smith that ‘we would take twice the losses to be rid 
of the Germans’; two days later, Air Marshal Vallin, Commander of Free French air forces in 
Britain (which had participated in some raids on France), broadcast a vigorous message of 
  
support for the raids in opposition to a recent appeal against them from French Cardinals.
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That the CFLN spoke with more than one voice allowed the Allies to choose. Thirdly, as 
M.R.D. Foot has observed, although sabotage used fewer explosives and killed fewer people 
than bombing, it could not be organised systematically from London, whereas a bombing raid 
could be ordered, executed, and assessed by SHAEF within hours. Sabotage might complement 
bombing; it could not replace it.
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 French involvement in targeting, finally, was raised by 
Churchill with Roosevelt on 7 May, but referred by the President, with the Transportation Plan 
itself, to the military commanders.
129
 The Chiefs of Staff considered that it was too late and 
(unlike the Foreign Office) had no wish to associate a Frenchman with plans entailing high 
French casualties. Churchill backed them, for a different reason: ‘a suggestion to de Gaulle of 
this kind would only give him another opportunity of obtruding himself.’130  
Whether de Gaulle himself could have made a difference is uncertain, because there is no 
evidence of his trying: neither speeches nor messages contain any but the most oblique allusions 
to bombing.
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 To do more would have placed the General in one of two politically damaging 
positions: either unsuccessful supplicant or co-organiser of bombing. But Allied resistance to 
French involvement persisted even after the recognition of France’s Provisional Government in 
October. A protest from General Bouscat, Chief of the French Air Staff, against the bombing of 
rail targets in Strasbourg and Colmar and requesting that the Allies took specialist French 
advice, met a dismissive response: Tedder’s personal staff officer, Leslie Scarman, observed 
that ‘I do not like the proposal that we should inform the French that when necessary we should 
consult French Railway technicians, when in fact, we have no intention of doing so at all.’132 
Conclusion and postscript 
Like the wider bombing offensive, bombing policy towards France sought to achieve a 
succession of overlapping, divergent, or even contradictory objectives, determined by the 
progress of the war. Several consistencies can nevertheless be observed. First, except between 
April and September 1944, France was a secondary target to Germany. Second, because France 
was enemy-controlled, but not enemy, territory, the usefulness of bombing had to be balanced 
against the political objections attached to killing French civilians. Political control of bombing 
  
policy, sometimes extending to single raids, could therefore be much tighter than in the case of 
Germany. A frequently dismissive attitude to protests from Vichy and Free French alike should 
not obscure two facts: the unoccupied zone was off limits till November 1942, and the attacks 
on the Biscay ports in early 1943 were the only instance of area bombing against France. French 
victims were strictly collateral damage. Third, however, attacks on precise objectives, often in 
built-up areas, had been rejected in relation to Germany by 1942 in favour of area bombing, 
chiefly because the bombers were not accurate enough. Inevitably, therefore, many ‘precision’ 
raids on France, even against lighter defences, would destroy French lives and property without 
seriously damaging their targets. Fourth, though raids were more accurate by 1944, they were 
also far larger. The attacks on Caen and Le Havre both hit their designated targets; to their 
civilian victims, they nevertheless felt like area bombing. Fifth, while political concerns could at 
least delay raids against some targets, such as industry in 1941–42, they were invariably 
trumped when vital military interests were seen as at stake. This happened over the Biscay ports 
and the Transportation Plan, despite the uncertainty surrounding the effective military 
contribution of air raids. Sixth, the political objections to bombing were strongest before 
November 1942 because of the real (to British minds at least) danger that France’s fleet and 
North African empire would be handed to Germany. The removal of this threat certainly 
facilitated the brief switch to area bombing of the Biscay ports weeks after the Torch landings. 
The implicit danger of Vichy action before Torch was more effective than any number of Free 
French protests after. Nor, in the end, did fears of poor post-war relations with France weigh 
against the perceived military imperative of the Transportation Plan. A final point is that the 
policy problems presented by the bombing of France are more likely to recur in the 
contemporary world than those relating to Germany. An all-out conventional air war against a 
major military power has been all but unthinkable since 1945. On the other hand, bombing 
territory in order to liberate it, while attempting to limit collateral damage to civilians, is a 
continuing challenge to today’s strategists. 
The first acknowledgement of the sufferings of the French came from what might appear an 
unlikely source. On 23 September 1944 Sir Arthur Harris wrote to all commanders of bomber 
groups to open a subscription, capped at 1 shilling per donor, to assist French children whose 
  
parents had been shot for helping downed Allied bomber crews, or whose families had suffered 
from Allied bombing. The subscription raised £12,765, or FF2.553 million, in barely a month. 
This was, it is true, rather less than the cost of a single Lancaster. It was nevertheless received 
gratefully by Massigli and by France’s (Communist) Health Minister, François Billoux.133 
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